The previous post listed four criticisms of Professor Todd Zywicki’s “Bankrupt Criticisms” column that appeared Tuesday at National Review Online. This post resumes from there.
A talking-points summary of the two-part deconstruction is HERE.
So, here we go again.
5. Zywicki thinks that bankruptcy shouldn’t be refiled more than once every 8 years, instead of the current 6 years.
Surprise: I agree, but not unconditionally. That’s because credit card issuer abuse of post-bankrupts was once rampant (it may still be), simply because the issuers KNOW that the cardholder can’t refile for another six years (or eight). Anybody they manage to hook again can spend years in penalty-fee and penalty-rate hell (obviously, two more years under the new bill) with no recourse.
It is a sad but true fact that many who come out of bankruptcy are no wiser than they were before they filed. Yes, it’s primarily their fault if they dig a hole again, but they don’t need any “help” from the credit vultures.
So, to prevent lender abuse or potential abuse of post-bankupts:
- Bankruptcy filers should be automatically placed on the credit bureau solicitation opt-out lists and the FTC’s National Do-Not-Call Registry for at least a couple of years after discharge.
- Lenders should be prohibited from ANY proactive direct-mail or telemarketing contact with those who emerge from bankruptcy for at least as long as the no-refiling period.
- Issuers of any new credit cards the post-bankrupt person obtains should not be allowed to raise their credit limit unless the person requests it, and must not raise the limit, or for that matter have an initial limit that is higher than they would grant to a person in otherwise similar circumstances who hasn’t had a bankruptcy.
- Issuers of any new credit cards to post-bankrupts whose credit deteriorates should only have the recourse of closing the cardholder’s account at its current rate, or perhaps a maximum rate allowed by law of, say 15% (no obscene penalty rates on post-bankrupts, period).
With these very easily doable controls in place (yes they ARE easily doable), and other controls I’ll talk about in a later post, if people dig themselves a hole a second time, it will be obvious that they deliberately set out to do it.
6. Zywicki gives too much credit (so to speak) to the bill’s homestead exemption reforms, which should be more comprehensive.
True, the homestead exemption doesn’t kick in unless under the new law until you have been in your home for 3 years and 4 months; this is an improvement. But what we need is a homestead exemption that is uniform nationwide after adjustment for regional house-price differences. This would largely eliminate the need for the 40-month qualification period, because there would be no meaningful benefit to homestead shopping.
The exemption should be set high enough to enable the large majority of filers to keep their homes. I’d have to study the issue to arrive at appropriate amounts; I would suppose that it should be somewhat above the equity a typical person might have in their home. But to elaborate, the exemption in a low-cost Midwestern state like Iowa would likely need to be three times higher in states like California and Massachusetts.
7. The arbitrary means-testing measurements (“the standardized slate of expenses”) will force many filers who should go into Chapter 7 into Chapter 13, and will only rarely move someone who today would have to file Chapter 13 into Chapter 7.
Not that I have been looking for it, but I have never seen or heard of a complaint about how, to quote Zywicki, “judges (use their) own subjective preference to determine the debtor’s allowed living expenses” (By the way, Professor, Zywicki, I’m told that it’s trustees, not judges, who do this). I doubt there are many complaints, from either debtors or creditors. It’s hard to believe that the “error rate” of trustees who work in the system every day is greater than the error rate that will result from arbitrary measurements and removal of trustee discretion. I also am concerned that many totally broke but above middle-income debtors will have a difficult time demonstrating that they have the so-called “special circumstances” that would enable them to avoid Chapter 13, and that “special circumstance” rerouting into Chapter 7 will be more rare than it should be.
What the micromanagement mandated by the law betrays is a total lack of confidence in the professionals that run the bankruptcy system. Nobody’s saying that there shouldn’t be oversight, and there already appears to be plenty of it. In fact I’ve been told that fairly specific guidance has been provided to trustees by the Director of the Trustee Program as to how to go about determining the reasonableness of claimed living expenses. I also have seen that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reports semiannually to Congress on the results of their audits of trustees.
If Zywicki and the bill’s proponents think trustees and their judicial overseers are currently abusing their discretion to give debtors a free ride, I would like to see them come right out and say so. And if he thinks trustees are colluding with debtors to release them from their obligations, it would be nice to know that too.
8. Zywicki makes a major factual error in estimating the number of people affected by the law.
He states: “Roughly 80% of filers….will get tossed out of the means test immediately. For that 80%–roughly 1.2 million of the 1.5 million bankruptcy filers last year—the means-test will be completely irrelevant.”
Well, let’s look at individual filings in the past 4 years ending September 30 (in thousands; the Chapter 13 figure also includes about 1,000 individual Chapter 11s each year; also, forgive me for not having this in a table-I’ll try to do that after I complete posting, because this post is long overdue):
Ch. 7 Ch. 13 Total 80% of Total
2004 1134 450 1584 1267
2003 1156 470 1626 1301
2002 1062 447 1509 1207
2001 991 408 1399 1119
If, as Zywicki states, 80% of ALL filers were to go to Chapter 7, we wouldn’t be having this debate, because more people would be going into Chapter 7 than are doing so currently, because in all four cases, the 80% of total figure is greater than the number that actually filed Chatper 7. The law would be more generous than it is today.
Fine, let’s go home…..but (OOPS) that’s not what he means.
What Zywicki presumably MEANT to say was “80% of those who would file for Chapter 7 under the current law will still be able to do so under the new law.”
This obviously leads to a vastly different result. What would the impact have been?
Ch. 7 20% to Ch. 13
2004 1134 227
2003 1156 231
2002 1062 212
2001 991 198
So, correcting for his error, one assumes Zywicki believes that if the new law had been in place on October 1, 2000, a total of 868,000 people who filed Chapter 7 in the next four years would have, and “should have,” preliminarily been tagged as candidates for Chapter 13. He then appears to opine (it’s not clear because of the error I have just described) that about half (434,000) of these intial Chapter 13s “won’t be able to meet the repayment criteria,” and would be dropped into Chapter 7.
So now that we think we have our arms around what Zywicki meant and his beliefs about the impact of the new law on Chapter 13 filings, we can look at how feasible this shift from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 might be.
9. Zywicki totally fails to communicate how Chapter 13 bankruptcies turn out today, and because of that misleads readers into thinking it’s a satisfactory solution.
You might think that moving more people into Chapter 13 a desirable thing to do. A quick look at how Chapter 13 works now will disabuse you of that notion. In fact, I believe it’s fair to say that Chapter 13 is not a good choice for many who use it, and that the results achieved in Chapter 13 filings would argue that more and not fewer people belong in Chapter 7.
Here are the facts, as communicated to me by someone who works within the bankruptcy system in Washington:
- Roughly 15% of Chapter 13 filings are converted into Chapter 7s before a plan is put into place, because it quickly becomes clear that a Chapter 13 is unrealistic.
- Roughly 40% are “discharged,” which in the vast majority of cases means that the creditors were fully paid what they were promised in the original Chapter 13 plan. In a small number of cases, discharge occurs because of hardship conditions.
- The remainder (45%) are “dismissed.” This means that the debtor has stopped making payments. When the case is dismissed, the person becomes “fair game”–the creditors can sue for payment and conduct other collection efforts.
What does this mean? To me it shows, contrary to what Zywicki and the bill’s proponents claim, that too many people currently file Chapter 13 when they should file Chapter 7! This happens for two reasons. First, many people do have a sense of honor and want to pay part of what they owe if they can, but are unrealistic as to their ability to actually do it. Second, since legal fees for Chapter 13 filings are much higher than those for Chapter 7s, many bankruptcy lawyers take advantage of that sense of honor and file Chapter 13 when they know darn well that their client would be better served by a Chapter 7. Then, if the client is moved to Chapter 7, they collect those fees too. A majority of those who begin a Chapter 13 aren’t able to carry through with what they intended to do, and when their cases are dismissed they are once again at the mercy of their creditors.
Does anyone think that more than a small percentage of Chapter 13 dismissals are from those who are trying to dodge their debts? If that were the case, they wouldn’t have filed Chapter 13 in the first place! Because their court protection is gone, these people are more than a little likely to face the “endless treadmill of payments” that Paul Krugman of the New York Times cited, and which Professor Zywicki mercilessly ridiculed. Imagine that; Paul Krugman appears to have nailed it. I would also add judgments, garnishments, and creditor harrassment to Krugman’s “endless treadmill.”
One unresolved question on Chapter 13s is what percentage of unsecured debt at the time of filing is typically scheduled for repayment in a Chapter 13 plan in the new law vs. the old law. Zywicki says that the bill will mandate that anyone who has “prequalified” for Chapter 13 based on income would stay in Chapter 13 if they can pay $10,000 or 25% of what is owed (I presume whichever is less, but I can’t tell for sure). I have read guidance about the current system indicating that many trustees won’t mandate a Chapter 13 unless the debtor can pay more than 50-75% of what is owed. It therefore appears that the new law’s version of Chapter 13 will require more initially “prequalified” Chapter 13 debtors to (try to) carry through with a repayment plan. That would be fine if Chapter 13s typically led to a discharge–The trouble is, they obviously don’t. So based on what I see, adding more filers to the broken Chapter 13 system, especially those just above the income thresholds in the new law that mandate Chapter 13, will only make it worse.
10. The preemptive credit-counseling provisions have potential, but should take place before bankruptcy looms.
Who can argue with a mandate that a person or family go through credit counseling before filing for bankruptcy? I will, because the law has taken a good idea and ruined it.
Section 106 as passed by the Senate states that “an individual may not… (file for bankruptcy) …. unless such individual has, during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing of the petition by such individual, received from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency …. an individual or group briefing (including a briefing conducted by telephone or on the Internet) that outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted such individual in performing a related budget analysis.
First, it appears that finding enough “approvable” credit counseling agencies will be difficult:
But recent Senate hearings describe the credit counseling industry as “a network of not for profit companies linked to for-profit conglomerates. The industry is plagued with consumer complaints about excessive fees, pressure tactics, nonexistent counseling and education, promised results that never come about, ruined credit ratings, poor service, in many cases being left in worse debt than before they initiated their debt management plan.”
Second, the law allows for ineffective group briefings in a situation where only individual or family counseling that works with a person’s or family’s actual finances is effective. The law even allows for “group briefings” over the telephone or Internet, where an instructor can only guess as to whether any learning is taking place, and leads to the possibility that a lot of so-called counseling agencies will merely be workshop mills with no followthrough.
Third, by not addressing how counselors are paid, the law will encourage the financial industry to continue to reduce their “fair share” payments to counselors who attempt to help their clients through payment plans, straining the ability of the agencies that indeed attempt to do a conscientious job to meet their clients’ needs.
Fourth, counselors need to get involved sooner. If they do they should have better success at preventing potential bankruptcies and should be able to avoid having to be the paymaster. How? I’ll get to that when I propose solutions in a later post.
11. Finally, Zywicki taunts his critics by insolently asking “Is there someplace where I can send you my part of the bill so that you can allow bankruptcy fraud and abuse to go unchecked?”
OK, Professor, here’s how I calculated your share:
- The Christian Science Monitor reports that the bill’s GOP sponsors believe that “If the means test only weeds out 100,000 to 150,000 abusive filings, as much as $3 billion could be recovered and passed through to other consumers…”
- We’ll give you a humongous benefit of the doubt and ignore the evidence in the previous post at Point 4 that the FBI, based on its long-term anemic rate of investigation and prosecution, appears to be wildly exaggerating the extent of bankruptcy fraud and abuse, and stick with the $3 billion.
- That $3 billion represents a whopping $10 for every man, woman, and child in America.
- So, where do I send the $10?
- Is there any chance that you might cease your pity-party for the financial industry if I send the money?
Oh, and finally, do you take Visa?