GAO Gets Radioactive Materials Past Inspectors at BOTH Borders
Here’s an excerpt from the Government Accountability Office’s abstract of their full report (PDF) released yesterday (paragraph breaks added to improve readability):
For the purposes of this undercover investigation, GAO purchased a small amount of radioactive sources and one secure container used to safely store and transport the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One of GAO’s investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company located in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detection pagers.
The purchase was not challenged because suppliers are not required to determine whether prospective buyers have legitimate uses for radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask a buyer to produce an NRC document when purchasing in small quantities. The amount of radioactive sources GAO’s investigator sought to purchase did not require an NRC document.
Subsequently, the company mailed the radioactive sources to an address in Washington D.C. The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted simultaneous border crossings.
Our investigators’ vehicles were inspected in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the northern and southern borders. However, GAO’s investigators, using counterfeit documents, were able to enter the United States with enough radioactive sources in the trunks of their vehicles to make two dirty bombs.
….. GAO investigators were able to successfully represent themselves as employees of a fictitious company present a counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC document during the secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP inspectors never questioned the authenticity of the investigators’ counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources.
The full report indicates that one of the “successful” crossings occurred at the Canadian border, and one at the Mexican border. Investigators used commercial, off-the-shelf computer programs to produce the counterfeit documents.
In terms of corrective action:
- Customs and Border Protection (CBP) “agreed to work with the NRC and CBP’s Laboratories and Scientific Services to come up with a way to verify the authenticity of NRC materials documents.”
- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) appears to be totally unimpressed (paragraph breaks added):
NRC officials disagreed with the amount of radioactive material we determined was needed to produce a dirty bomb, noting that NRC’s “concern threshold†is significantly higher. We continue to believe that our purchase of radioactive sources and our ability to counterfeit an NRC document are matters that NRC should address.
We could have purchased all of the radioactive sources used in our two undercover border crossings by making multiple purchases from different suppliers, using similarly convincing cover stories, using false identities, and had all of the radioactive sources conveniently shipped to our nation’s capital.
Further, we believe that the amount of radioactive sources that we were able to transport into the United States during our operation would be sufficient to produce two dirty bombs.
I would think that the question of whether or not the GAO snuck through enough fissionable material for dirty bombs would be easily answered, and it’s hard to believe there’s a legitimate difference of opinion on this. If there actually is, being a cautious person, I choose to be more than a little worried about what the GAO pulled off, and the NRC’s nonchalant reaction.
The GAO did its investigation late last year, and had its follow-up discussions with the agences involved in December and January.
It is now nearly five years since the September 11 attacks. The fact that this aspect of border protection remains so apparently weak is inexcusable.









