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	<title>Comments on: Weekend Question 1: When Will the E-Voting Vulnerabilities Get the Attention They Deserve?</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.bizzyblog.com/2006/09/16/weekend-question-2-when-will-the-e-voting-vulnerabilities-get-the-attention-they-deserve/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.bizzyblog.com/2006/09/16/weekend-question-2-when-will-the-e-voting-vulnerabilities-get-the-attention-they-deserve/</link>
	<description>The Business End of the Blogosphere</description>
	<pubDate>Sun, 23 Nov 2008 18:43:11 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: TBlumer</title>
		<link>http://www.bizzyblog.com/2006/09/16/weekend-question-2-when-will-the-e-voting-vulnerabilities-get-the-attention-they-deserve/#comment-30778</link>
		<dc:creator>TBlumer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Sep 2006 20:50:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.bizzyblog.com/2006/09/16/weekend-question-2-when-will-the-e-voting-vulnerabilities-get-the-attention-they-deserve/#comment-30778</guid>
		<description>#1, I think they might have done the independent review, which appears to have been woefully inadequate. 

If I am wrong and they have not done an independent review, the people buying the machines have made a big mistake by not demanding one before purchase--and that included the Ohio SOS office.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>#1, I think they might have done the independent review, which appears to have been woefully inadequate. </p>
<p>If I am wrong and they have not done an independent review, the people buying the machines have made a big mistake by not demanding one before purchase&#8211;and that included the Ohio SOS office.</p>
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		<title>By: Porkopolis</title>
		<link>http://www.bizzyblog.com/2006/09/16/weekend-question-2-when-will-the-e-voting-vulnerabilities-get-the-attention-they-deserve/#comment-30739</link>
		<dc:creator>Porkopolis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Sep 2006 16:42:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.bizzyblog.com/2006/09/16/weekend-question-2-when-will-the-e-voting-vulnerabilities-get-the-attention-they-deserve/#comment-30739</guid>
		<description>There is only one voting system I can think of that will 100% accurate and it is limited by the physical location of those voting and the numbers of voters.

This system would entail a relatively small number of voters (a few hundred a most) gathering in an auditorium and then physically moving to one side of the room or other to cast their vote.  Everyone involved in the vote can then see how everyone else voted.  Congressional roll calls come close to this model.


I point this out, because it sets the baseline to compare all other voting systems.
As we move away from this model we start whittling away at the 100% accuracy/assurance of a vote because we then introduce the possibility of fraud.

The best we can then hope for is designing a system that minimizes the potential for fraud to an acceptable level. 

Diebold and all voting system designers have a responsibility to submit whatever system they design for independent review.  The independent analysis should come back and say, "While no automated system is free from fraud, we have found system X has at Y% chance of being comprimised."</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is only one voting system I can think of that will 100% accurate and it is limited by the physical location of those voting and the numbers of voters.</p>
<p>This system would entail a relatively small number of voters (a few hundred a most) gathering in an auditorium and then physically moving to one side of the room or other to cast their vote.  Everyone involved in the vote can then see how everyone else voted.  Congressional roll calls come close to this model.</p>
<p>I point this out, because it sets the baseline to compare all other voting systems.<br />
As we move away from this model we start whittling away at the 100% accuracy/assurance of a vote because we then introduce the possibility of fraud.</p>
<p>The best we can then hope for is designing a system that minimizes the potential for fraud to an acceptable level. </p>
<p>Diebold and all voting system designers have a responsibility to submit whatever system they design for independent review.  The independent analysis should come back and say, &#8220;While no automated system is free from fraud, we have found system X has at Y% chance of being comprimised.&#8221;</p>
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