The Fred and Fan Folderol
I haven’t written much on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac yet, because I’ve covered it and basically predicted it previously, and because I knew someone would put out a better column more quickly than I could.
First, here are excerpts from that better column, by Arnold Kling at Pajamas Media (bold is mine):
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are known as government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) because they were created by the government and have enjoyed special regulatory privileges. However, they are both privately owned, with shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
Fannie Mae was created during the Depression, as an institution that would purchase mortgage loans. At the time, many regional banks failed, and Fannie Mae was like a giant national bank specializing in home mortgages.
Freddie Mac was created in 1970, to address a different problem. California was chronically short of mortgage money, and other states’ lending institutions had excess capital but were precluded by law from lending across state lines. Freddie Mac was chartered to create a “secondary mortgage market,†which would allow a mortgage lender in one state to purchase securities backed by mortgages originated by other lenders in other states. To do so, Freddie Mac guaranteed repayment of the loans.
Neither Freddie Mac nor Fannie Mae originates mortgage loans. As a home buyer, you will never deal directly with a GSE to obtain a loan. Instead, the GSEs buy mortgage loans that are originated by other firms, including banks and mortgage bankers.
….. Congress and regulators gave the GSEs a regulatory advantage in purchasing investment-quality loans, meaning loans to highly-qualified borrowers making substantial down payments (20 percent of the value of the home to avoid having to pay for mortgage insurance, or 10 percent of the value of the home if additional private mortgage insurance was obtained). Through regulatory differences, primarily in the form of capital requirements, banks were put at a disadvantage relative to the GSEs when it came to holding investment-quality loans.
However, the GSEs have recently suffered large credit losses on loans that were not of investment quality. These low-down-payment loans were similar to the subprime mortgage loans that fueled the boom and bust cycle in housing. It is not clear why the GSEs chose to purchase these loans, since they are outside of the GSE charters. One story has it that they were afraid of losing market share. Another story I have heard is that the GSEs were under pressure from Congress to do more to provide funds for “affordable housing,†and the GSEs interpreted this as requiring more high-risk lending.
Stop the tape, so to speak.
Fan and Fred looked to expand its mission, as government agencies or government-backed entities usually do. Because going to riskier, low down-payment loans was “outside of their charter,” I think it’s fair to ask if it was also illegal. In terms of why they did this, I choose the “affordable housing” pressures.
When real businesses go to far afield into areas they aren’t familiar with and fail, the market punishes the owners. This means that owners usually know better than to let their managers go too far outside their expertise. But when government agencies or government-backed entities do this, all too often, as is the case with Fan and Fred, there’s no penalty. Instead, there’s a bailout.
Back to Kling, who refers to a former member of the vice-presidential search committee of Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama (link within excerpt is in original; bolds are mine) who has, like so many others, been thrown under the bus:
In hindsight, Freddie and Fannie were allowed to grow too large. They used political connections to fend off any attempt to rein them in, as can be seen in a 1997 story on James Johnson, then-chairman of Fannie.
The plan that Treasury Secretary Paulson announced on Sunday appears designed to shore up the GSEs and to return to the status quo prior to the recent loss of confidence by investors. In fact, however, I think it is unrealistic and undesirable to return to the status quo.
….. In my opinion, the playing field should be leveled as soon as possible so that banks can begin to buy assets from the GSE’s. Let the banks feed off the carcasses of Freddie and Fannie, just as Freddie and Fannie once fed off the carcasses of the S&Ls.
….. I see the GSE crisis as a failure of central planning. The GSEs were the victim of no one, unless you count the meddling by the Congressional meddlers whom the GSEs needed to please. Anyone could see that the GSE dominance of the mortgage market was unhealthy. But the political process was unable to get the job done. What the central planners tend to forget is that political failure is even more entrenched than market failure.
Many (although not all) of the GSEs’ enablers over the past decade have been Democrats.
….. The Treasury plan shows that the response to a failure of central planning is likely to be more central planning. Intellectually, those of us who prefer markets have a good case. Politically, we are in the process of getting steamrollered. The Treasury plan is being attached to a housing bill that was rife with corporate welfare and unsound subsidies. It ought to be vetoed, but instead it will be fast-tracked.
In other words, we’re, like, taken to the cleaners yet again.
If there’s anything to be learned from this going forward, it should be this: “No more bureacracies.” Not health care. Not energy crap and trade (not a typo). Not “industrial development.” Forget it. What government effort besides the military has ever worked as intended, or even if it has sort of worked, hasn’t cost exponentially more than intended?
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Now, here are selected previous posts on the Fan and Fred, with occasional selected quotes.

